Insurance -- Recovery of Attorney\u27s Fees in Suit to Enforce Policy by unknown
University of Miami Law Review 
Volume 7 Number 1 Article 14 
12-1-1952 
Insurance -- Recovery of Attorney's Fees in Suit to Enforce Policy 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.miami.edu/umlr 
Recommended Citation 
Insurance -- Recovery of Attorney's Fees in Suit to Enforce Policy, 7 U. Miami L. Rev. 122 (1952) 
Available at: https://repository.law.miami.edu/umlr/vol7/iss1/14 
This Case Noted is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at University of Miami School of Law 
Institutional Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in University of Miami Law Review by an authorized 
editor of University of Miami School of Law Institutional Repository. For more information, please contact 
library@law.miami.edu. 
MIAMI LAW QUARTERLY
accord that, while the verdict will not be upset, the remarks are improper
and should be excluded from the trial record.
12
The three justices dissenting in the instant case' 3 pointed out that the
jury has a right to recommend, or decline to recommend, mercy with or
without any reason, and is entitled to know whether a life sentence really
means that the defendant will serve for life. An earlier case,' 4 in which the
same circumstances were before the court, resulted in the conviction being
upheld. The majority opinion cites this case as being not contrary to the
decision here. They do not, however, attempt to distinguish the two, and
a distinction is not apparent. A long line of Georgia decisions'5 has upheld
convictions in cases where the solicitor general has remarked to the jury con-
cerning the parole law. Some of the remarks have been highly prejudicial."
This was probably' 7 the first direct holding in Georgia that it constitutes
reversible error for the court to instruct the jury on the function of the
parole board.
It is submitted that this is one of the elements to be considered by the
jury. "'8 When the court so informs them, it is merely charging the law.'9
All the cases in which this question is presented involve heinous crimes. It
is evident that the jury, while willing to extend mercy and thus prevent
capital punishment, desire assurance that the defendant will not be turned
loose upon society. This is a meritorious consideration in determining, once
guilt has been established, whether a recommendation should be made.
INSURANCE-RECOVERY OF ATTORNEY'S FEES IN SUIT
TO ENFORCE POLICY
Plaintiff beneficiary, having successfully sued the defendant for dis-
ability benefits on a foreign life insurance policy, claimed reasonable attor-
12. \Vechter v. People, 53 Colo. 89, 124 Pac. 183 (1912); State v. Junkins, 147
Iowa 588, 126 N.W. 689 (1910).
13. Strickland v. State, 209 Ga. 65, 70 S.E.2d 710 (1952).
14. McRae v. State, 181 Ga. 68, 181 S.E. 571 (1935).
15. McLendon v. State, 205 Ga. 55, 52 S.E.2d 294 (1949); Hyde v. State, 196 Ga.
475, 26 S.E.2d 744 (1943); Thorton v. State, 190 Ga. 783, 10 S.E.2d 746 (1940);
Sloan v. State, 183 Ca. 108, 187 S.E. 670 (1936); White v. State, 177 Ga. 115, 169
S.E. 499 (1933); Manchester v. State, 171 Ga. 121, 155 S.E. 11 (1930); Lucas v. State
146 Ga. 315, 91 SE. 72 (1916).
16. McLendon v. State, 205 Ca. 55, 52 S.E.2d 294, 299 (1949) ("If you give the
defendant a life sentence, his lawyers and some politicians will get him out of jail, and
have him walking the streets in a few years"); White v. State, 177 Ga. 115, 169 S.E.
499, 504 (1933) (" , . . it means that after three years this defendant has a right to
ask for a parole by going over with a sob sister from the interracial commission.").
17. But see Thompson v. State, 203 Ga. 416, 47 S.E.2d 54 (1948) (Trial judge
answered jury that the parole law is changed so often, he didn't know what it was at the
moment. In reversing, the court said in effect that the jury was instructed that next
week, next month or n~ext year defendant might be released).
18. State v. Carrigan, 93 N.I.L. 268, 108 Aft. 315 (1919).
19. Strickland v. State, 209 Ga. 65, 70 S.E.2d 710, 712 (1952) (dissenting opinion);
Massa v. State, 37 Ohio App. 532, 175 N.E. 219 (1930).
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CASES NOTED
ney's fees as provided for by Florida statute.' Such fees were not recoverable
in the state where the contract was executed. 2  Held, the statute is proced-
ural and applies to Florida suits on insurance contracts made anywhere.
Feller v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc'y of the United States, 57 So.2d 581
(Fla. 1952).
Statutes penalizing insurance companies for failure to pay claims within
a specified time or for refusal to pay until brought to judgment are invoked
under the police power of a state in the regulation of a business affected
with a public interest.3  The penalties imposed are either a percentage of
the amount recovered 4 or a sum equal to reasonable attorney's fees,5 or
both," the purpose being to discourage insurers from delaying payments or
contesting claims and to reimburse beneficiaries who are forced to sue for
benefits to which they are entitled.7
Such statutes have long been held constitutional when applied to local
contracts, locally enforced.8 But when a penalty statute is applied in an
action on a foreign contract, made in a state where such penalty does not
attach, the question arises as to whether such application contravenes the
full faith and credit clause of the Federal Constitution.9
The case controlling this problem has been Aetna Life Ins. Co. v.
Dunken,10 concerning an action on a foreign contract by a Texas citizen in
a local court, wherein the United States Supreme Court held that since the
law of Tennessee," where the contract was made, entered into and became
part of the contract, the Texas penalty statute12 could not be constitution-
ally applied. The instant case is distinguished by the majority opinion from
the Dunken case on the ground that the Texas statute was intended to
1. FLA. STAT. § 625.08 (1951) (reasonable attorney's fees are to be included in
any decree or judgment in any Florida court in favor of a beneficiary against the insurer).
2. Feller v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc'y, 57 So.2d 581, 582 (Fla. 1952).
3. See United States Fire Ins. Co. v. Dickerson, 82 Fla. 442, 451, 90 So. 613, 616
(1921).
4. TENN. CODE ANN. § 6434 (Michie 1952).
5. NEB. REV. STAT. § 44-359 (Cum. Supp. 1949).
6. ARK. STAT. ANN. tit. 66, § 514 (Supp. 1951).
7. See Feller v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc'y of the United States, 57 So.2d 581,
586 (Fla. 1952).
8. E.g., Life & Cas. Ins. Co. of Tennessee v. McCray, 291 U.S. 566 (1934) (Arkansas
statute allowing twelve per cent penalty plus attorney's fees was not a violation of the
due process or equal protection clauses); Hartford Life Ins. Co. v. Blincoe, 255 U.S. 129
(1921) (Missouri statute imposing damages up to ten per cent of amount of loss and
reasonable attorney's fees was not a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment); Manhattan
Life Ins. Co. v. Cohen, 234 U. S. 123 (1914) (Texas statute allowing twelve per cent
damages plus reasonable attorney's fees, not a violation of the Constitution); Farmers'
& Merchants' Ins. Co. v. Dobncy, 189 U.S. 301 (1903) (Nebraska statute allowing
attorney's fees upon judgment against insurer, not a violation of the equal protection
clause).
9. U. S. CoNsr. Art. IV, § 1.
10. 266 U.S. 389 (1924).
11. TENNESSEE CODE § 6434 (1919) (penalty for refusal to pay within specified
period, if in good faith, did not include attorney's fees).
12. TExAs REV. Civ. STAT. Art. 4736 (1911) (for failure to pay within specified
period, twelve per cent of the claim plus reasonable attorney's fees).
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create a substantive right in the beneficiary by becoming part of every local
contract,' whereas the Florida statute is procedural, applicable only to suits
in Florida courts. 14 Just how this distinction bears on the ultimate issue is
open to question, because state characterization of its own statute as substan-
tive or procedural for conflict of laws purposes does not bind the federal
courts on the question of constitutionality.' If the effect of its application
is to give the lex fori unwarranted control over foreign contracts in disregard
of the lex loci contractus, the statute may be deemed unconstitutional when
used in that manner.'6  Some control is tolerated, depending on the forum's
interest in the subject matter of the contract,'7 but the mere fact that one
of the litigants is a citizen of that state, as in the instant case, does not
constitute sufficient interest to warrant such extraterritorial power.' 8
It becomes apparent then, that characterization by the state court of the
Florida penalty statute as procedural does not circumvent the rule in the
Dunken case on the basis that the Texas statute was substantive, because
the effect in both instances is exactly the same,-the foreign insurer would
be subjected to forum penalties which were not assessable in the state where
the contract was executed. Thus, agreeing with the dissent,19 it is submitted
that the holding in the instant case is directly opposed to the prevailing rule
as set forth in the Dunken ease.2°
SALES - LITERARY PROPERTY - IMPLIED WARRANTY
Plaintiff, purchaser of all rights in a story, sued for alleged breach of
an express warranty of marketability of title after notice that a third party
was claiming a portion of the proceeds of the sale. Held, that despite the
use of the words "complete," "unconditional" and "unencumbered," de-
scribing the title, an express warranty was not created and a warranty of
13. See Feller v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc'y of the United States, 57 So.2d 581,
584 (Fla. 1952).
14. Ibid.
15. See Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397, 406-407 (1930).
16. See Hartford Ace. & Indemnity Co. v. Delta & Pine Land Co., 292 U.S. 143
1934) (statute of limitations); Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Dunken, 266 U.S. 389 (1924)
penalty statute); Bish v. Employers' Liability Assur. Corp. Ltd., 102 F. Supp. 343
(W.D. La. 1952) (direct action statute).
17. See Hartford Aec. & Indemnity Co. v. Delta Pine Land Co., 292 U.S. 143,
150 1t934).
.Id. at 149.
19. Feller v. Equitable life Assur. Soc'y of the United States, 57 So.2d 581, 587
(Fla. 1952) (referring to Aetna v. Dunken, Thomas J., dissenting, said, "We are in no
position to disagree when the Supreme Court of the United States has spoken on a
matter involving the interpretation and application of the Constitution of the United
States.").
20. Cf., Mutual Ben. Health & Ace. Ass'n. v. Bowman, 96 F.2d 7, 10 (Sth Cir.
1938) (where the court said, "While there are facts in this case not like those in Aetna
v. Dunken, [cit. omitted], yet that case is controlling here because the facts leave no
doubt that this policy ds a contract made in New Mexico and, therefore not subject to
the Nebraska statute allowing attorney's fees."
